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The Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws on the Flow of Subprime 
Credit* 
By Giang Ho and Anthony Pennington-Cross 
 
Local authorities in North Carolina, and subsequently in at least 23 other states, have 
enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending. While there is substantial 
variation in the laws, they typically extend the coverage of the Federal Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, by 
lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and by prohibiting or 
restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties. Empirical results show that 
the typical local predatory lending law tends to reduce rejections, while having little impact on the 
flow (application and origination) of credit. However, the strength of the law, measured by the 
extent of market coverage and the extent of prohibitions, can have strong impacts on both the 
flow of credit and rejections. 
 
1. Introduction 
The current mortgage market consists primarily of two segments—the prime market and 
the subprime market. The prime market extends credit to the majority of households. The 
subprime market provides more expensive credit to households who do not qualify for a prime 
mortgage. These households tend to be less financially secure and located in low-income areas 
and areas with a concentration of minorities. The combination of higher borrower costs and 
higher rates of delinquency and foreclosure have led to public policy concerns over fairness and 
accessibility of credit. 
Subprime lending represents an opportunity for the mortgage market to extend the 
possibility of home ownership beyond traditional barriers. These barriers have existed because 
the prime segment of the mortgage market uses lending standards (credit scores, documented 
employment history, income, and wealth, among other factors) to accept or reject loan applicants. 
Applicants that are rejected or expect to be rejected can look to the more expensive subprime 
market. In this fashion the subprime market completes the mortgage market and can be welfare 
enhancing (Chinloy and MacDonald [4]) because it provides the opportunity of home ownership 
to a larger portion of the population. 
Over the past ten years subprime lending has grown rapidly—from $65 billion to $332 
billion of originations from 1995 through 2003 (Inside Mortgage Finance [16]).1 According to the 
Mortgage Bankers Association of America, the rate that loans were in foreclosure from the first 
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quarter of 1998 to the third quarter of 2004 rose by more than 400 percent for subprime loans 
while declining by approximately 25 percent for prime loans. In addition, during the same time 
period anecdotal evidence of predatory lending in the subprime market was gaining more public 
and regulatory attention.2 Therefore, the welfare benefit associated with increased access to 
credit is believed to have been reduced by some unscrupulous lending in the subprime mortgage 
market. 
In response to public concerns of predation in the subprime mortgage market, federal 
regulations generated under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) restrict 
some types of high-cost lending. Many states, cities, and counties have used HOEPA as a 
template and have extended the restrictions on credit to an even broader class of mortgages. 
These restrictions include limits on allowable prepayment penalties and balloon payments, 
prohibitions of joint financing of various insurance products (credit, life, unemployment, etc.), and 
requirements that borrowers participate in loan counseling. 
By introducing geographically defined predatory lending laws, policymakers have 
conducted a natural experiment with well defined control and treatment groups. Since state 
boundaries reflect political and not economic regions, we can compare mortgage market 
conditions in states with a law in effect3 (the treatment group) to those in neighboring states 
currently without a predatory lending law (the control group). However, instead of examining 
whole states we focus on households that are geographically close to each other (border 
counties) and as a result are in similar labor and housing markets. 
Data at the individual loan level are used to identify the impact of local predatory lending 
laws on subprime applications, originations, and rejections. We create an index that measures 
the strength of the local laws. This index measures the increase in market coverage and the 
extent that certain lending practices and mortgage types are restricted. We find that the strength 
of the law can have strong impacts on both the flow of credit and rejections. In fact, variation in 
the law design can create substantial heterogeneity in the response of the mortgage market to 
local predatory lending laws, and therefore the findings of previous research on the North 
Carolina law cannot be generalized to other states. 
This paper provides at least three contributions to the literature: (i) a wide variety of local 
predatory lending laws are characterized, (ii) the question of whether the market response in 
North Carolina (reduce flow of credit) was typical or atypical is examined, and (iii) the importance 
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2. Potential Impacts of Predatory Lending Laws 
Assume that a predatory lending law is introduced that imposes restrictions on subprime 
mortgage lenders in terms of allowable loan types, required lending practices, and information 
disclosures. By reducing the menu of available loan types some borrowers will have a more 
difficult time qualifying for a loan. In particular, prepayment penalties and balloons mitigate the 
debt to income requirement by reducing debt servicing (lower periodic interest payments and a 
slower amortization schedule). Therefore, if profitable and complying substitutes for these loan 
characteristics cannot be identified, fewer loans will be originated and lending standards will be 
tighter.  
In addition, if a law cannot perfectly identify predatory loans the law will also restrict some 
legitimate lending. While beyond the scope of this paper, in order to determine if the law will have 
a net positive impact requires weighing the benefits of stopping predation versus the cost of 
denying access to legitimate high cost credit. 
The impact of the law that requires tighter lending standards on the number of 
applications is a little more indirect. If households apply for a loan regardless of the probability of 
the application being accepted, a tightening of lending standards will have no impact on 
application rates. In contrast, if there is an application cost (time or money) potential applicants 
should be deterred from applying when the chance of being accepted is low.4 Therefore, we 
should expect that a tightening of subprime lending standards would be associated with a 
reduction in the number of subprime applications. In addition, the impact of the law on the 
rejection rate is indeterminate and will depend on the shape of the application function 
(probability of applying) and its responsiveness to changing lending standards.5 
However, in a market with some dishonest loans, all borrowers must exert extra effort 
and time to screen the lender and loan documents to sort the honest from the dishonest loan 
offers. This effort represents extra costs (transaction costs) for the borrowers (Akerlof [1]) and as 
a result the uncertainty in loan quality can deter potential applicants from applying. If the 
introduction of the predatory lending law removes or heavily regulates dishonest loans there 
could be a reduction in the fear of being taken advantage of and a lessening in the need to 
expend effort sorting honest loans from dishonest loans. Therefore, in markets where potential 
applicants are deterred from applying due to fears of predation, the impact of a predatory lending 
law could be neutral or could even increase the rate of subprime application and origination.  
 
3. Literature on Predatory Lending Laws 
Research on predatory lending laws has been primarily focused on the impact of the 
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North Carolina law and found that the law significantly reduced the flow of credit. Various 
methods and data sets have been used for analysis. Each data source has its different set of 
strengths and weaknesses. For example, Quercia, Stegman, and Davis [20,21] and Elliehausen 
and Staten [6] use data sources (proprietary loan information6 and asset backed securities 
information7) that provide a rich set of information on product types. However, these data 
sources only cover certain segments of the subprime mortgage market. Therefore, while these 
data may be useful for understanding changes in product types and interest rates they are less 
useful in helping to understand the impact of the predatory lending laws on the subprime market 
as a whole and the volume of credit in particular. In contrast, research by Ernst, Farris, and Stein 
[7] and Harvey and Nigro [11,12] use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
which provides extensive market coverage, but has little information on product types. Despite 
the lack of detailed loan information, for the purpose of volume comparisons as conducted in this 
paper HMDA is the preferred source because of its better market coverage. 
In addition, prior studies compare mortgage market conditions in North Carolina to 
neighboring states, regions (groups of states), or all of the US and conclude that differences in 
mortgage types or volume of credit is due to the predatory lending law. However, the use of large 
geographic areas may make it difficult to separate out the impact of the law versus unobserved 
regional shifts. Therefore, it is preferable to limit the sample to locations that have more similar 
labor and housing markets. 
 
4. National Lending Restrictions—Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
Act (HOEPA) 
State and local predatory lending laws typically follow the structure of national predatory 
lending regulations as defined by HOEPA. Therefore, before proceeding to the discussion of 
local predatory laws it is instructive to examine HOEPA first. HOEPA and the regulations 
promulgated under it define a class of loans that are given special consideration.8 
HOEPA-covered loans (loans where HOEPA applies) include only closed-end9 home equity 
loans that meet annual percentage rate (APR) and finance fee triggers. Home purchase loans 
and other types of lending backed by a home, such as lines of credit, are not covered by HOEPA. 
In the 2002 version, HOEPA protections were triggered in one of two ways: 
 
(i) if the loan’s APR exceeded the rate for Treasury securities of comparable maturity by 8 
percentage points or more on the first lien and 10 percentage points or higher on 
subordinate liens, or  
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(ii) if finance charges, including points and fees paid at closing for optional insurance 
programs and other debt protection programs, were greater than 8 percent of the loan 
amount or a fixed $480 amount indexed annually to the consumer price index. 
 
For HOEPA-covered loans, creditors were not allowed to provide short-term balloon 
notes, impose prepayment penalties greater than five years, use non-amortizing schedules, 
make no-documentation loans, refinance loans into another HOEPA loan in the first 12 months, 
or impose higher interest rate upon default. In addition, creditors were not allowed to habitually 
engage in lending that did not take into account the ability of the consumer to repay the loan.  
 
5. Regional Restrictions—State and Local Predatory Lending Laws 
A number of states and local municipalities have sought to impose restrictions on 
predatory lending that reach further than HOEPA and Regulation Z. Ho and Pennington-Cross 
[13] provide a detailed description of each law in their Appendix A.10 
Beginning with North Carolina in 1999, at least 23 states have passed predatory lending 
laws that were in effect by the end of 2004. North Carolina—the first state to enact predatory 
lending restrictions—extended HOEPA to include both closed-end and open-end mortgages that 
satisfy the conventional conforming loan limit (loans small enough to be purchased by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and therefore not considered part of the jumbo market). While the North 
Carolina law did not adjust the APR triggers, the points and fees triggers were reduced from the 
HOEPA 8 percent to 5 percent for loans under $20,000. For loans $20,000 or larger, the same 8 
percent trigger is used or $1000, whichever is smaller. The North Carolina law also prohibits 
prepayment penalties and balloon payments for most covered loans. However the law does 
extend HOEPA restrictions by prohibiting the financing of credit life, disability, unemployment, or 
other life and insurance premiums into the mortgage. 
While most states followed the North Carolina example by expanding the coverage and 
restrictions associated with HOEPA, there is substantial variation in the laws. In an attempt to 
quantify the differences in the local laws, we created an index. The higher the index, the stronger 
the law is. In addition, the index can be broken down into two components. The first component 
reflects the extent that the law extends market coverage beyond HOEPA. The second 
component reflects the extent that the law restricts or requires specific practices on covered 
loans. Table 1 summarizes the construction of the law index. The full index is the sum of all the 
assigned points as defined in Table 1 and the coverage and restrictions indexes are the sum of 
points assigned in each subcategory. 
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The coverage category includes measures of loan purpose, APR first lien, APR higher 
liens, and points and fees. In general, if the law does not increase coverage beyond HOEPA it is 
assigned zero points. Higher points are assigned if the coverage is broader. In each category the 
highest points are assigned when all loans are covered. For example, points assigned for loan 
purpose range from zero to four and the highest point total (four) indicates that the law covers all 
loan purposes. The points assigned for extending first lien APR trigger ranges from zero to three 
depending on how low the trigger is. For example, 7 percent triggers are assigned one point 
while 6 percent triggers are assigned two points. In addition, laws that do not have a first lien 
trigger are assigned three points. A similar scheme is used to assigned points for higher lien 
triggers and the points and fees triggers. In general, if the law includes multiple triggers within a 
category the most stringent trigger is used to assign the points.11 
The restrictions index includes measures of prepayment penalty restrictions, balloon 
restrictions, counseling requirements, and restrictions on mandatory arbitration. If the law does 
not require any restrictions then zero points are assigned. Higher points indicate more 
restrictions. For example, laws that do not restrict prepayment penalties are assigned zero points, 
while laws that prohibit all prepayment penalties are assigned four points. Laws that prohibit or 
restrict the practice more quickly are assigned higher points. For balloon restriction, the points 
vary from zero for no restrictions to four when the law prohibits all balloons.12 The last two 
restrictions measure whether the law requires counseling before the loan is originated or restricts 
fully or partially mandatory arbitration clauses. 
Table 2 reports the calculated full (law) index, the coverage index, and the restrictions 
index for each law identified as being in effect by the end of 2004. The average law index is 
10.16, varying from 4 in Florida, Maine, and Nevada to 17 in New Mexico and Cleveland. The 
coverage index and the restrictions index have a mean just over 5. The coverage and restrictions 
indexes are only modestly correlated at 0.19. This indicates that, while laws that increase 
coverage more also tend to increase the restrictions more, the relationship is very noisy. 
Therefore, there are laws that increase coverage without increasing restrictions (Nevada) and 
other states that extend restrictions more than coverage (Florida). 
Scaled indexes are created and reported in Table 3. This is necessary because the 
magnitude of each subcomponent of the index implicitly weights the index so that it represents 
some subcomponents more than others. To help correct for this, each subcomponent number is 
scaled so that the maximum value equals one (actual/max). It is then divided by the category 
mean value [(actual/max)/mean(actual/max)] so that each category has a mean of one. 
Therefore, the scaled index equally reflects each subcomponent in terms of marginal impacts 
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and the level of the index. Since eight categories are used to create the law index the mean 
value of the index is by design eight. Zero also retains the appealing intuition of reflecting no 
increase in law strength beyond HOEPA. The scaled law index varies from 17.16 to 1.47 and the 
scaled and original law index are highly correlated (0.87). 
 
6. Data Design, Identification, and Probit Estimation 
To see whether the experience in North Carolina as examined in prior literature is typical 
for all local predatory lending laws, we provide a more complete analysis using a pooled sample 
of local laws. We use individual loan data provided in HMDA in conjunction with the HUD 
subprime lenders list.13 Any loan application or origination associated with a lender on the list is 
identified as a subprime loan. All other loans are treated as not-subprime, that is, as a 
conventional loan. Because it is impossible to fully characterize borrower and location 
characteristics, the sample is reduced to include only counties at state borders, where labor and 
housing market conditions are likely more similar.14 In particular, for the treatment group we use 
counties that lie in states with a predatory lending law in place and adjacent to a state without 
such a law. The control group includes counties in neighboring states that border the treatment 
state and do not have a predatory lending law in effect.15 This contrasts with other studies 
(Harvey and Nigro [12], Elliehausen and Staten [6]) that have used whole states or regions to 
define both control and treatment groups. This approach should help to increase the 
comparability of the treatment group and the control group because they are geographically 
closer and, as a result, likely to be more economically similar than full state and region 
comparisons. In addition, to help remove the impact of any temporary reaction to each law and 
any market reaction prior to the law coming into effect, only the year before and the year after the 
law is in effect are included in the sample. This sampling procedure and HMDA availability 
reduce the sample to ten local predatory lending laws: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  
 
6.1. Identification and Estimation Strategy 
To identify the impact of a local predatory lending law, we employ the 
difference-indifferences approach. By including indicators of location and the time period when 
the law becomes in effect, we can interpret the difference between the treatment and control 
group in the post-legislation time period as reflecting the impact of the law on mortgage market 
conditions. In addition, we also control for various borrower and location characteristics. Similar 
to Harvey and Nigro [11,12], three separate dependent variables (three outcomes) are tested for 
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impacts of local predatory lending laws—the probability of applying for a subprime loan relative 
to all (prime and subprime) applications, the probability of originating a subprime loan relative to 
all originations, and the probability of being rejected on a subprime application. The base model 
is specified in Eq. (1) as: 
	 







 ∑ "#$   %&'''  ()	  *	 , (1) 
where ), , and , index respectively the individual loans, the time period, and law samples, 
Ineffect indicates the time period and location where a law is effective, Law indicates that the 
loan is in a location that will eventually have a law, Postlaw indicates that it is the time period 
when the law is in effect, Sample indicates the law sample (control and treatment), Borrower 
represents various borrower characteristics, Location represents various location characteristics, 
and *	 represents an identically and independently distributed random error term. For each 
outcome (application, origination, or rejection), the dependent variable is binary. We estimate Eq. 
(1) using the probit specification, which limits the estimated probabilities between zero and one 
and assumes a standard normal probability distribution.16 
The key variable of interest is Ineffect. This variable indicates that a loan is in a location 
when and where a predatory lending law is effective. It is defined as zero before the law is 
effective, even in the treatment location, and is always zero in the control location. Ineffect is 
constructed by interacting the variable Law, which indicates treatment groups, and Postlaw, 
which indicates the time period the treatment is in effect. Therefore, Law identifies the location 
specific fixed effect and Postlaw identifies the time specific effects common to the treatment and 
control locations. Our estimation sample consists of ten local law samples each of which includes 
loans in the treatment location and the control location.17 The variables Law and Postlaw are 
interacted with each law sample, with the North Carolina sample excluded as the reference 
group. The impact of the average law can then be interpreted directly from the Ineffect variable. 
Given the results from prior research we would expect Ineffect to be negative for the application 
and origination outcome and potentially insignificant for the rejection outcome.  
Following Harvey and Nigro [11,12] and Elliehausen and Staten [6], we include a series 
of control variables associated with the location of the loan (Location) and the borrower 
(Borrower) because they may impact the demand or supply of subprime credit. Table 4 provides 
definitions of variables and data sources. In general we expect that borrowers will be more likely 
to use/apply for subprime loans (and perhaps be rejected by subprime lenders) in locations with 
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difficult economic conditions and when borrowers have lower income or are in minority areas 
(Calem, Gillen, and Wachter [3] and Pennnington-Cross [18]). Location characteristics are 
proxied by the Census tract’s income relative to metropolitan area income, the percent of 
minority population in the tract, the county unemployment rate, housing vacancy rate, and 
population growth rate. Borrower characteristics are proxied by borrower income and the 
loan-to-income ratio. In general, we expect that applicants with more income relative to their loan 
amount will have an easier time meeting prime underwriting requirements and therefore should 
be less likely to apply for or receive a subprime loan. One important caveat to this analysis is that 
the borrower’s credit history or credit score, which has been shown to be a very important 
determinant of mortgage performance for both subprime and prime loans (Pennington-Cross 
[19]), is not reported in the HMDA data and therefore cannot be included in this analysis. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of the variables by outcome. The application 
sample includes over 590,000 prime and subprime loan applications; the origination sample 
includes over 390,000 prime and subprime originations; and the rejection sample includes over 
89,000 subprime applications, which are either accepted or rejected.18 Just over 20 percent of 
the applications were subprime, while only 9.7 percent of the originations were subprime. 
Consistent with the relative magnitude of applications and originations, the average rejection rate 
is very high for our sample of subprime loans: 42.9 percent. The borrowers and applicants 
typically have loans approximately twice the size of their income. In addition, as expected, the 
income of subprime applicants (rejection sample includes rejects and accepts of subprime loans 
only) is substantially lower than for the overall sample (application and origination samples 
include both subprime and prime loans). Subprime applications also come from census tracts 
with a higher concentration of minority households. The law sample dummy variables indicate 
that the Maryland sample is the largest proportion of the sample and the Texas sample is the 
smallest. 
 
6.2. Base Model Results 
We estimate the model specified in Eq. (1) using maximum likelihood. Table 6 provides 
the estimated coefficients, the standard error of the estimates, and the marginal impact of each 
variable at a specified interval and evaluated at the mean of all other variables. Results are 
reported for each outcome (application, origination, rejection). 
The main variable of interest is Ineffect. This coefficient indicates whether the introduction 
of the law has had any impact on the application, origination, or rejection of subprime loans on 
average. The coefficient estimates are negative and significant at the 1 percent level in the 
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application equation and rejection equation, and insignificantly different from zero in the 
origination equation. The marginal impacts can be interpreted as a percentage point change 
from the mean predicted probability. Therefore, the average impact of a local predatory lending 
law, using the variable Ineffect, is a reduction of 5.1 percentage points in the probability of being 
rejected (mean = 42.9 percent), and a reduction of 1.2 percentage points in the probability of 
applying (mean = 20.5 percent).19 Therefore, the average law is associated with only a small or 
statistically insignificant change in the flow of credit (apply or originate), but with a substantial 
reduction in the probability of being rejected on a subprime application. 
Results for other control variables largely meet expectations. Location, borrower, and 
mortgage characteristics indicting economic stress are positively associated with the probability 
of applying for a subprime loan. For instance, subprime applications are positively associated 
with lower borrower income, higher loan-to-income ratios, lower-income census tracts, higher 
concentrations of minority populations, lower population growth rates, and higher unemployment 
rates. However, subprime applications are negatively associated with higher vacancy rates. This 
may partly reflect the need of many subprime applications to have substantial equity in their 
home to compensate for weak credit history. 
The results for originations are very similar to the application results. However, higher 
vacancy rates, lower population growth rates, and higher loan-to-income ratios are all negatively 
associated with subprime origination probabilities. Again, the vacancy results may indicate the 
need for housing equity in the underwriting of subprime loans to compensate for other 
weaknesses in the loan application. In addition, consistent with the population growth results, 
Pennington-Cross [18] found that subprime loans were a larger part of the mortgage market in 
locations where economic conditions were stressful but improving. Coefficient estimates for the 
rejection equation also show that in general more adverse economic conditions are all 
associated a higher probability of rejection. 
Results for the time and location indicators and law sample dummy variables are not 
presented to conserve space. As expected, coefficient estimates differ widely in sign and 
magnitude because they capture the prevailing probabilities in various time periods and locations. 
For example, the Law coefficients in the application equation, which indicate treatment locations, 
range from −0.19 (Texas sample) to 0.66 (California sample). 
 
6.3. Results—Strength of the Laws 
While the average law may have only modest impacts on the flow of credit, it may be that 
relatively more stringent laws may have a larger impact. In general it is expected that stronger 
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laws should be associated with larger reductions in applications and originations due to tighter 
lending standards. In addition, stronger laws may reduce rejections by deterring marginal 
applications or through increased screening by lenders to ensure law compliance.  
To gauge the potential relevance of a law’s strength, we estimated two additional models. 
Model II replaces the Ineffect variable with the scaled law index as an explanatory variable, and 
Model III replaces the full law index with the disaggregated law indexes along the dimensions of 
coverage and restrictions. The results (coefficient, standard error, and marginal effects) are 
reported in Table 7.20 
In Model II, the coefficient estimates indicate that stronger laws are associated with lower 
probabilities of applying for a subprime loan and being rejected on a subprime application. 
However, law strength had no impact on the probability of originating a subprime loan. Again, the 
magnitude of the impact on the probability of applying is very small. For example the marginal 
impact, measured by a one-standard-deviation increase in the index from the mean, is only −0.7 
percentage points in the application equation. In contrast, the marginal impact is much larger for 
rejection (−3.17 percentage points). This is highlighted in Fig. 1, which plots the change in the 
probability of the outcome (apply, originate, and reject) relative to the strength of the law. 
The strength of the law can also be measured along the dimensions of coverage and 
restrictions. If appropriate substitutes cannot be found, more restrictions on allowable lending 
should lead to less lending because lenders are required to tighten lending standards to comply 
with the law. Therefore, originations should be lower for stronger laws and likely applications will 
be deterred due to the reduced availability of loan types. In Model III, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the 
coefficient estimates indicate that laws with more or stronger restrictions are associated with 
reduced probabilities of applying and originating subprime loans. For example, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the scaled restrictions index reduces the probability of applying by 4.9 
percentage points and the probability of originating by 2.2 percentage points. In addition, the 
marginal impact of restrictions gets larger as coverage increases. For example, the reduction in 
the probability of applying in response to a one-standard-deviation increase in the restrictions 
index increases from 4.4 to 6.1 percentage points as the coverage index goes from zero to six.21 
The impact of increased coverage of a law, after controlling for restrictions, is largely an 
empirical question. If there is no problem with dishonest loans in the subprime market, more 
coverage should unambiguously reduce applications and originations. However, if potential 
applicants are deterred from applying because of fear of being taken advantage of by dishonest 
lenders or do not apply because of the cost of sorting the honest from the dishonest, then the 
introduction of a law that covers more applications may be associated with more applications due 
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to a reduced fear of predation and a lower cost of screening. Model III in Table 7 and Fig. 3 report 
that laws with broader coverage tend to be associated with increased originations and 
applications. In fact, the coefficient estimates are very similar in magnitude, although they have 
the opposite signs, to the impact of stronger restrictions. The marginal impact of a 
one-standard-deviation increase in coverage increases the probability of applying for a subprime 
loan by 6.6 percentage points and the probability of originating a subprime loan by 3.5 
percentage points. As illustrated in Fig. 3, when a law is passed that covers your loan application 
more households are willing to apply. In other words, consistent with a market with a dishonest 
lenders problem, the demand for subprime credit can actually increase when a predatory lending 
law is enacted.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Starting with North Carolina in 1999, states and other localities across the United States 
have introduced legislation intended to curb predatory and abusive lending in the subprime 
mortgage market. These laws usually extend the reach of the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, lowering 
annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers and prohibiting and/or restricting the 
use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties on covered loans. 
While prior literature found evidence that the North Carolina law did reduce the flow of 
credit, the results in this paper indicate that the typical law has little impact on the flow of 
subprime credit as measured by loan origination and application. However, rejections do decline 
by over 10 percent for the typical law. The reduction in rejections may reflect less aggressive 
marketing, additional pre-screening by lenders, increased self-selection by borrowers, a shift in 
applications to unregulated lenders, or other factors. While a reduction in rejection rates may not 
have been the intent of the predatory lending law, it does indicate that borrowers are benefiting 
by saving non-refundable application costs when rejected for a subprime loan. 
However, not all local predatory lending laws are created equal. The strength of the law is 
measured along two dimensions—coverage and restrictions. Some laws provide broad coverage 
of the subprime market (Colorado) and others very little coverage (Texas). Some have 
substantial restrictions (Georgia) on allowable lending, while others have very few restrictions 
(Maine). The results indicate that coverage and restrictions tend to have opposite impacts. In 
general, laws with more extensive restrictions are associated with larger decreases in the flow of 
credit. In fact, laws with the strongest restrictions can decrease applications by over 50 percent. 
In contrast, laws with broad coverage can increase applications by even more than 50 percent. 
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Therefore, although on the surface local predatory lending laws seem to have little impact, the 
design of the law can stimulate the subprime market, depress the subprime market, or leave 
volumes relatively steady but with lower rejection rates. As a result, the design of the law can 
have economically important impacts on the flow and make-up of the mortgage market. 
 
Notes 
* The views expressed in this research are those of the individual author and do not 
necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal 
Reserve System, and the Board of Governors. 
1. These numbers are derived from type B&C loans. B&C loans are loans with less 
than an A (or prime) rating. See the Mortgage Markets Statistics Annual published by Inside 
Mortgage Finance for more details on loan classification schemes. 
2. See HUD-Treasury Report (HUD-Treasury [15]) and Federal Reserve HOEPA 
Final Rule (Federal Resrve [8]). 
3. Laws are first enacted by the local legislature and become effective typically at a 
later date. It is not until the law becomes in effect that lenders are required to follow the new 
rules and restrictions. 
4. While we do observe in the marketplace some rejections of prime applications, 
empirical research has shown that subprime loans are rejected at a much higher rate than 
prime loans: 33 percent versus 9 percent (Scheessele [22]). For those applicants who are 
reported as rejected in HMDA they may look to lenders who do not report to HMDA and are 
more likely to be unregulated for a loan or may reapply at a later point in time. 
5. Ferguson and Peters [9] and Ambrose, Pennington-Cross and Yezer [2] present a 
more formal presentation of mortgage applications and lending standards which is similar to 
the concepts discussed here. 
6. The data was provided by nine members of the American Financial Services 
Association (AFSA). AFSA represents some of the largest subprime lenders (Ameriquest 
Mortgage Company, Conseco Finance Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, Equity One, 
CitiFinancial, Household Finance Corporation, Key Consumer Real Estate, Washington 
Mutual Finance and Wells Fargo Financial, Inc.). 
7. LoanPerformance, a private data vendor, leased mortgage information based on 
securitized loans. If loans of better quality (A-rated) or pricing tend to have higher rates of 
securitization, then the LoanPerformance data represent only one segment of the subprime 
market. This is consistent with Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross [5] who show that the 
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Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA) rate of foreclosures has different time 
series properties than the LoanPerformance rate and was on average has almost three times 
higher. 
8. Congress enacted HOEPA (Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 21600) by amending the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA, 15 USC 1601). In 1994, the Board of Governors implemented 
HOEPA through 12 CFR part 226 (Regulation Z), which articulates specific rules governing 
lending practices. The original version, in 1994, set out the framework and defined the 
triggers and restrictions. The second version, in 2002, adjusted some of the triggers and 
restricted some additional practices. 
9. Closed-end loans are loans that disburse a certain amount of money to the 
borrower and are repaid over a fixed time period. Lines of credit are an example of an 
open-ended loan because the borrower can withdraw (increase the loan amount) more 
money at their discretion until the line of credit terminates at a predetermined point in time. 
10. Every attempt was made to include all laws in effect by the end of 2004 that, 
similar to HOEPA, use triggers to define a class of loans eligible for restrictions and 
disclosures. Because other laws are likely to exist, those discussed here should be viewed 
as a sample of all the state and local predatory lending laws. Other states have laws that do 
not focus on high-cost or subprime lending and do not have any triggers (Idaho, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, and 
West Virginia).  
11. For example, some laws have different triggers depending on loan amount or 
other distinctions. 
12. The law in Cleveland was determined to be restrictive and was assigned four 
points despite not neatly falling into any of the categories.  
13. http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html, accessed on 2/1/2005. HUD 
generates a list of subprime lenders from industry trade publications, HMDA data analysis, 
and phone calls to the lender confirm the extent of subprime lending. Since this list is defined 
at the lender level, loans made by the subprime lenders may include both prime and 
subprime loans. In addition, subprime loans made by predominately prime lenders will also 
be incorrectly identified as prime lending. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the loans 
identified using the HUD subprime lender list is that it identifies the extent of specialized 
subprime lending—not full-service lending. 
14. This is similar to the approach used by Holmes [14], who examined the impact of 
right-to-work laws on manufacturing employment at state borders in order to isolate the effect 
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of state policies from other state characteristics. 
15. This geographically based sampling does not create a “matched” sample, where 
one similar loan in the treatment location is matched with another loan in the control location. 
In short, all observed loans in the specified location and time periods are included. 
16. The probit specification is given by Pr/0 
 1 | 45 
 6/475, where 0 is the 
outcome (application, origination, or rejection), 4 is a vector of explanatory variables,  is a 
vector of parameters, and 8/95 denotes the standard normal distribution. As given in Greene 
[10], the log-likelihood for the probit model is  
 
  ln<1 = 6/475>
?@
  ln 6/475
?@
, 
where A and 4 are, respectively, the observed values of outcome 0 and explanatory 
variables 4 for observation ). 
17. To enhance computational feasibility, we only include a 10 percent random 
sample of each location in the pool sample. We also estimate using the 25 and 50 percent 
random samples and find that results are robust across sample sizes. 
18. The rejection sample excludes loans whose application was withdrawn by 
applicant or whose file was closed for incompleteness. 
19. We calculated the marginal effect for the Ineffect variable using the 
“double-difference” approach outlined in Norton, Wang, and Ai [17]. Specifically, since 
Ineffect is the interaction between Law and Postlaw, the full interaction effect is the change in 
the predicted probability for a change in both Law and Postlaw, and therefore, does not only 
depend on the Ineffect coefficient. 
20. To conserve space all the control variables are not reported. In addition, 
specification tests were conducted including both the variable Ineffect and the laws indexes. 
In all cases the Ineffect variable was insignificant and is not reported.  
21. Note that zero coverage indicates that the law does not extend coverage beyond 
HOEPA. However, the law still covers some of the market. 
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Appendix 




Note. All other variables are set to their mean and the law index is increased from 0 to the 
maximum observed value using Model II. Probabilities are indicated by fractions so that 0.05 is a 
five percent change in probability. 
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Note: All other variables are set to their mean and the law index is increased from 0 to the 
maximum observed value using Model III. Probabilities are indicated by fractions so that 0.05 is a 
five percent change in probability. 
 
  
Ho, Pennington-Cross 20 




Note: All other variables are set to their mean and the law index is increased from 0 to the 
maximum observed value using Model III. Probabilities are indicated by fractions so that 0.05 is a 
five percent change in probability. 
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Note: The law index is calculated by summing all categories. The coverage and restrictions 
indexes are created by summing the subcategories. 
  
Ho, Pennington-Cross 22 





Ho, Pennington-Cross 23 




Note: The coverage and restrictions indexes are modestly correlated (0.21). 
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 Ho and Pennington-Cross [13] provide a detailed description of each law in their Appendix A. 
The detailed descriptions of the laws are too long to include in this paper and have been 
summarized by the law index discussed above. 
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Note: During estimation the law sample dummy variables are interacted with Law and Postlaw as 
part of the identification strategy. 
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Note: Marginal effects for the continuous variables are estimated as the discrete change in 
probability as the variable deviates from its sample mean by an appropriate unit. The chosen 
units are reported in the last column. 
 
  
Ho, Pennington-Cross 27 




Note: Marginal effects for the indexes are estimated as change in probability as an index 
deviates from its mean by one standard deviation. Standard deviations are as reported in Table 
3. 
